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17 
THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FRENCH ARMY  




At the outset, it must be made clear that you cannot lump to-
gether, or reduce to monolithic groups, the army, judges, public offi-
cials, and “intellectuals” as though their members could only think 
and behave in lock-step uniformity.  Such a precaution needs to be 
taken even more carefully when dealing with the army, an institution 
where speaking out officially in public is strictly regulated.1  The ar-
my, or at least some of its members, figured significantly in the Drey-
fus affair in its three successive parts: the incident of espionage, the 
legal case, and lastly, the political ramifications. 
Based on the results of my research in the military archives, 
my topic will be to examine how the high command of the French 
army behaved in the course of these three periods. 
I. ESPIONAGE 
We must not forget that the origin of the entire affaire was a 
 
* General André Bach had a classic military career in the French army between 1965 and 
2000, mainly as a paratrooper.  He participated in several missions, including one in 1985-
1986 with a battalion of United Nations peacekeepers in Southern Lebanon.  During this pe-
riod of service, he also held various positions in communications, education, and historical 
research.  A graduate of the Institut d‟Études Politiques in Paris, he was the head of Le 
Cours Histoire et Stratégie militaire at l‟École de Guerre and, for three years, Le Service 
Historique de l‟Armée de Terre au château de Vincennes—which houses military archives, 
including the “secret file” used to convict Captain Dreyfus.  General Bach is a specialist in 
the history of the Third Republic, in particular the period of World War I.  He is the author 
of L‟ARMÉE DE DREYFUS, UNE HISTOIRE POLITIQUE DE L‟ARMEE FRANÇAISE DE CHARLES X A 
“L‟AFFAIRE” (Tallandier 2004).  It is this book that inspired Pierre Vidal-Naquet to comment 
“From this point on, the affair, while not ceasing to be absurd, becomes intelligible.” 
1 See PIERS PAUL READ, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: THE SCANDAL THAT TORE FRANCE IN TWO 
51 (2012) (“After its humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, the French Army had 
been reorganised along the lines of its German counterpart which had so emphatically dem-
onstrated its superiority in the field.  Conscription was introduced and the High Command 
was divided into four departments, or bureaux.”). 
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case of espionage, a fact that has never been called into doubt.2  How 
it was discovered and conducted weighs significantly in the errors 
that marred the legal phase. 
At this point in my research, my thesis, which can be chal-
lenged, is that from the beginning there was an effort at disinforma-
tion carried out from the highest French political and military eche-
lons to distract the attention of the German military attaché in Paris 
from the top-secret improvement of a cannon prototype; its cutting-
edge technology was considered a likely critical asset in any eventual 
armed confrontation with Germany.3  In order to do this, a corrupt of-
ficer, Major Esterhazy, who possessed certain credible but non-vital 
information, was manipulated to make contact with the attaché and 
hold out to him the prospect of gaining access to numerous secret 
documents.4  This type of contact is always very perilous for a mili-
tary attaché, whose official function does not involve spying.  There 
is always a risk of dealing with a pawn (someone who is being mani-
pulated) or with a set-up.  To dispel such doubt and protect the at-
taché, I believe, without having any formal proof of this, that the 
bordereau (note) must have been a document penned in a handwrit-
ing imitating Esterhazy‟s, forged by the French service in charge of 
security at German embassies, and slipped, somewhat torn, into the 
attaché‟s wastebasket.  This wastebasket, emptied by a French em-
ployee, was an ideal receptacle in which to transmit information to 
the enemy.5 
Seen from the German side, such a practice had to allow for 
any doubt to be dispelled about the nature of this enigmatic spy, the 
bearer of secrets that his military position did not make him privy to.  
If they heard subsequently that Esterhazy had been arrested, it would 
certainly confirm that the discarded papers in the wastebasket were 
getting to the French counter-espionage department, but first and 
foremost, they would know where things stood.  Esterhazy being ar-
rested, and thus exposed, would mean that Esterhazy was not being 
manipulated by the opposing departments.  The loss of this source of 
information would not be a loss at all, because it could turn out that 
he was only an intermediary; the next task would be to approach the 
 
2 See id. at 52 (discussing French anxiety over espionage). 
3 Id. at 59-61. 
4 ÉMILE ZOLA, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: “J‟ACCUSE” AND OTHER WRITINGS 180 (Alain Pagès 
ed., Eleanor Levieux trans., Yale Univ. Press 1996). 
5 READ, supra note 1, at 59. 
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“deep throat” who was furnishing information from high-ranking 
sources without wishing to become known.6  If he were not arrested, 
contact with him would have to be broken off, because it would mean 
being caught up in an attempt at disinformation.  All this merely ex-
emplifies the ordinary thought processes in milieu routinely im-
mersed in this kind of government activity. 
Much to the Germans‟ surprise, a third unexpected scenario 
ensued.7  It was not Esterhazy who was arrested, but another officer, 
Captain Dreyfus, unknown to the German departments.8 
On October 27, 1916, in the midst of the Battle of Verdun, 
during a dinner for General Petain in Souilly, France, M. Hanotaux, 
minister of foreign affairs at the time Dreyfus was charged, evoked 
these secret dealings, the source of the judicial error, by justifying 
them: “This affair revolved around the hydraulic brake.  It‟s an inter-
esting question since it was kept secret until the war.  It‟s what made 
the 75 mm model superior to the German 77 mm model.”9  Thus, the 
atmosphere is one of dirty tricks. 
When these tricks, carried out in secrecy, go awry, they create 
innocent victims or result solely in the conviction of minor, low-level 
players; the responsible parties are rarely affected, since the powers-
that-be realize that revealing the truth would be harmful, either to the 
government or to important figures.10  Every nation will thereby hide 
the reality of a dirty trick, and will deny it, to protect the higher inter-
ests of the government.  Once such a denial is proclaimed, it is ob-
vious that the innocence of the person, caught up by mistake in a me-
 
6 See Mark Feldstein, Who Is Deep Throat? Does It Matter?, AM. J. REV. (Aug./Sept. 
2004), http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=3736 (discussing the term “deep throat”). 
7 See ZOLA, supra note 4, at 179 (explaining that it was Alfred Dreyfus who was arrested). 
8 NICHOLAS HALASZ, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE: THE DIARY OF CAPTAIN ALFRED DREYFUS 
19-21 (1977); see also ZOLA, supra note 4, at 179-80. 
9 Document Conservé Archives École Supérieure de Guerre, École Militaire Paris: Entre-
tien Pétain-Hanotaux (Oct. 27, 1916) [Interview with Pétain Hanotaux, War College, École 
Militaire Paris (Oct. 27, 1916)] (a reproduced excerpt of this conversation is on file with the 
Touro Law Review); see also Germany: 7.7cm Feldkanone 96 n.A, LANDSHIPS, 
http://www.landships.freeservers.com/feldkanone_96_na.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) 
(“The Germans had just started to distribute the FK C/96 to the troops, when the French in-
troduced their famous „75,‟ a gun that revolutionized gun design forever.  And over-night the 
French gun made the technically new German C/96 completely obsolete.”). 
10 See Third Republic 1892-1906 - The Dreyfus Affair, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/fr-third-republic-5.htm (last modified 
Nov. 7, 2011) (stating that authorities—backed by parliament—refused to reopen the Drey-
fus case even after having received a letter denouncing Major Esterhazy as the Bordereau‟s 
true author). 
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chanism beyond his control and incomprehensible to him, does not 
weigh heavily in the equation: an individual‟s interests are subordi-
nate to those of the nation.  Concealing acts like these is easy to ac-
complish because they took place clandestinely.  Clearing the name 
of the innocent party would require revealing the deception, which 
was totally out of the question in the international sphere. 
II. WHO WERE THE MILITARY LEADERS WHO THRUST DREYFUS 
INTO THIS AFFAIR? 
First, Dreyfus was the victim of the French counter-espionage 
department.11  This bureau had only risen to prominence through the 
will of General Boulanger, the Minister of War at the time.12  This 
department, reorganized in 1886, was charged with tracking down, 
investigating, and prosecuting those guilty of violating the law of 
April 18, 1886.13  Grown too big, too fast, this organization, which in 
its new format was only eight years old in 1894, was characterized by 
the mediocrity of its staff.14  Its head, Commander Sandherr, suffered 
a mental collapse just as the Dreyfus affair was beginning and was 
provisionally replaced by his assistant, Major Henry.15  Even today 
we can only be surprised to see a boor of this sort in such a delicate 
position; he may have been well trained in basic police methods, but 
was completely unsuited for his office.16  We would say today that he 
was completely miscast for his role.17  In this particular case, all Hen-
ry did was send off the bordereau, according to protocol, to his supe-
riors at the War Ministry.18 
Second, Dreyfus was the victim of anti-Semitism from the of-
 
11 GENERAL ANDRE BACH, L‟ARMÉE DE DREYFUS 549-56 (2004). 
12 Third Republic 1886-1889 - The Boulanger Affair, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/fr-third-republic-4.htm (last modified 
Nov. 7, 2011). 
13 Les Enseignements du Capitaine Alfred Dreyfus, CONSEIL REPRÉSENTATIF DES 
INSTITUTIONS JUIVES DE FRANCE (July 19, 2011), http://www.crif.org/fr/actualites/Les-
enseignements-du-Capitaine-Alfred-Dreyfus25631?language=en [hereinafter Les Enseigne-
ments]; see also LESLIE DERFLER, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR 1 (Linda S. Frey & Marsha L. Frey 
eds., 2002). 




18 DERFLER, supra note 13. 
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ficers in the Army General Staff.19  These officers were greatly com-
posed of young, middle-class men who, while at the officers‟ school, 
had been exposed to the ideology of the landed aristocracy and were 
greatly influenced by anti-Semitic sentiments fed by prejudices 
stemming from their family and professional backgrounds.20 
Like the mostly Catholic milieu they came from, they had in-
tegrated into their world-view the implicit or explicit opprobrium dis-
seminated by the Church toward the Jews.21  In addition, for the 
German-speaking officers from Alsace, particularly well represented 
in espionage and counter-espionage (Sandherr, Picquart, Lauth, 
Junck, Fritsch, etc.), Alsatian anti-Semitism (similar to its German 
variety), formed part of their world-view.22  Moreover, the conquest 
of Algeria and Tunisia had, for decades, put quite a few officers in 
contact with Sephardic communities there.23  Having made the stra-
tegic choice to win over the Arab tribes, French officers widely 
adopted the past prejudices of these tribes.24  Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that when a spy was sought among the recently commis-
sioned officers of the General Staff, suspicion immediately fell upon 
the only officer who was Jewish.25  Nevertheless, we must avoid ge-
neralization and over-simplification.  During Dreyfus‟s two-year ap-
prenticeship, that is to say four six-month stints in the four different 
bureaus at headquarters, he had only aroused suspicion in one of 
them—the one responsible for the mobilization of the army and troop 
movement to the borders.26  He had been praised for zeal and compe-
tence in the other three bureaus.27 
In a certain way, Dreyfus was the victim of the reform put in-
 
19 BACH, supra note 11, at 529-38; see also Les Enseignements, supra note 13; Steven Lu-
bet, Why the Dreyfus Affair Does and Doesn’t Matter, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 329, 330 (2010) 
(reviewing LOUIS BEGLEY, WHY THE DREYFUS AFFAIR MATTERS (Yale Univ. Press 2009)) 
(distinguishing the Dreyfus Affair from the Rosenbergs). 
20 Les Enseignements, supra note 13; see also DERFLER, supra note 13, at 7. 
21 Les Enseignements, supra note 13; see also DERFLER, supra note 13, at 129. 
22 Les Enseignements, supra note 13; see also DERFLER, supra note 13, at 40, 129. 
23 Les Enseignements, supra  note 13; see also DERFLER, supra note 13, at 129 (discussing 
the riots which took place in Algeria, as well as in many other major Jewish communities). 
24 Les Enseignements, supra note 13; see also DERFLER, supra note 13, at 129. 
25 Alfred Dreyfus and “The Affair,” JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/Dreyfus.html (last visited Sept. 
20, 2012). 
26 Les Enseignements, supra note 13. 
27 Id. 
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to place by General de Miribel, chief of the General Staff.28  This 
reform had been established so that the recruitment would no longer 
be carried out through co-option, but rather through merit, as deter-
mined by class rankings bestowed at the École de Guerre.29  Co-
option, with its unwritten rules, had the advantage of functioning dis-
cretely.30  At the end of the nineteenth century, one of the unwritten 
rules in all European armies was to prohibit access to positions of 
command to Jews.31 
No better proof of this could be found than in the subtle 
handwritten note sent to the chief of personnel by the same General 
de Miribel, the author of the reform that gave Dreyfus, ranked twelfth 
in his class at the École de Guerre, automatic entry to a high level of 
the general staff.32  This very short note remains in General Va-
labrègue‟s personnel file to this very day and it states: “22 January, 
1891.  General de Miribel has given the order to the chief of the per-
sonnel department at headquarters not to accept Major Valabrègue to 
a post at the general staff.”33  Major Valabrègue, a “brilliant officer,” 
second in his class at the École de Guerre in 1880, given consistently 
high mention thereafter, was born into the Jewish community in the 
region of Avignon, France.34 
In 1892, as a result of the reform, it became impossible to 
send such a note about new promotions, since rank at the École de 
Guerre was now the deciding factor.35  On the other hand, in cases of 
suspected disloyalty, for certain officers on the general staff, there 
was no need to look any further if a Jew had been associated with 
those bureaus.36  This attitude explains why Captain d‟Aboville of the 
fourth bureau immediately suggested Dreyfus‟s name—and only his 





31 Les Enseignements, supra note 13. 
32 Id. 
33 Dossier du Personnel du Général Valabrègue (conservé au Service Historique) [Person-
nel file of General Valabrègue (preserved in the History Department)]. 
34 Les Enseignements, supra note 13. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.; see also Lubet, supra note 19, at 329-32 (stating that Dreyfus was targeted solely 
because of his Jewish origin). 
37 Les Enseignements, supra note 13; see also MAURICE PALÉOLOGUE, MY SECRET DIARY 
OF THE DREYFUS CASE 1894-1899 16 (Eric Mosbacher trans., 1957) (stating the proposition 
that whoever was responsible for writing the bordereau had to be part of the General Staff 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/5
2012] THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FRENCH ARMY 23 
the time served to justify the immediate initial suspicion lodged 
against him.38 
III. THE LEGAL CASE 
At this point we enter into the legal case with the Minister of 
War, General Mercier, playing a leading role in the unfolding drama. 
At the dinner for Pétain in October 1916, Hanotaux recalls: 
When I saw the Affaire taken on by General Mercier, I 
went myself to the Ministry to find him, I told him that 
he was going to plunge the Army and FRANCE into a 
difficult crisis, that he must wait before ordering the 
arrest [of Dreyfus] at his home, that he must send 
DREYFUS to the provinces where he could be moni-
tored and caught red-handed, which was Impossible in 
PARIS.  The general let me speak.  He pulled out his 
watch and replied: “Too late—the arrest has already 
been carried out.  General MERCIER was inept, he 
has made a grave mistake; probably because of his 
ambition.  DRUMONT was pressuring him . . . .”39 
 
and had to be an artilleryman); DERFLER, supra note 13, at 118 (noting that Dreyfus‟s “un-
popularity and Jewish origins accounted for a presumption of guilt”); LOUIS BEGLEY, WHY 
THE DREYFUS AFFAIR MATTERS (2009), as reprinted in 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/books/excerpt-why-the-dreyfus-affair-matters.html?pagewanted=all 
(observing that Dreyfus was singled out due to his racial background); Lubet, supra note 19, 
at 331 (explaining that suspicion fell on Dreyfus because he was the only member of the 
General Staff who was Jewish). 
38 See BEGLEY, supra note 37 (explaining that although Dreyfus‟s handwriting was similar 
to that on the bordereau, “slanted, highly cursive script was [being] taught at every school,” 
and therefore it should not have came as a surprise); Lubet, supra note 19, at 331 (noting that 
several graphologists were unable to agree on whether or not it was Dreyfus‟s handwriting 
on the bordereau, but nevertheless, his Jewish origins made him an easy target). 
39 Document Conservé Archives École Supérieure de Guerre, École Militaire Paris: Entre-
tien Pétain-Hanotaux (Oct. 21, 1916) [Interview with Pétain Hanotaux, War College, École 
Militaire Paris (Oct. 21, 1916)].  Drumont refers to Edouard Drumont, an anti-Semitic jour-
nalist and writer who wrote La France Juive—a two-volume book on Jews in France—and 
founded La Libre Parole, “a daily journal of rabid anti-Semitic tendencies.”  Drumont, 
Edouard Adolphe, JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/5336-drumont-edouard-adolphe (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2012); see also Les Enseignements, supra note 13; PALÉOLOGUE, supra note 37, at 
12 (showing Hanotaux‟s declaration: “If you have no evidence other than this letter and a 
resemblance of handwriting, I am opposed to any judicial proceedings, and even to any in-
quiry.  The national interest is at stake”); Brief History of the Affair, THE UNIV. OF PA. LIBR., 
http://sceti.library.upenn.edu/dreyfus/affair.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (stating that 
General Mercier fabricated documents in order to incriminate Dreyfus). 
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General Saussier, the commander-in-chief, whom I suspect is 
the source of the disinformation and the manipulation of Major Es-
terhazy through the intermediary of his agent Maurice Weill, had 
then declared to the President of the Republic, Casimir-Périer: “Drey-
fus is not guilty.  That fool Mercier has put his finger in his own eye 
again!”40 
In the trial, we cannot fault the code of Military Justice, but 
can fault certain irregularities, mainly the handing over of documents 
by Mercier, unbeknownst to the lawyer, and the pressure put on the 
military judges by the swaggering Henry, who, calling it his duty and 
assured of being backed up by the hierarchy, used his position and 
rank to impress the judges.41  
IV. THE POLITICAL AFFAIR 
With Dreyfus in prison, the stage was set for the political af-
fair.  Once the decision was made to refuse to reexamine the Dreyfus 
case—not because of anti-Semitism, but in order to avoid a reprise of 
the political disorders—the anti-Semitic factor became less important 
for high-ranking politicians and military leaders.42 
There are several distinct phases in this process, set in motion 
by Picquart‟s revelations.43  The French Government, along with 
Premier Méline, quickly understood how reopening the Dreyfus case 
could destabilize the country.44  France‟s Minister of War, very dis-
trustful and suspicious of the General Staff, urged the General Staff 
to set up the ridiculous masquerade with the thought that by protect-
ing Esterhazy, they might protect the General Staff.45  General de 
 
40 PALÉOLOGUE, supra note 37, at 33. 
41 See DERFLER, supra note 13, at 89-90; Brief History of the Affair, supra note 39 (stating 
that Mercier “furnished judges with a „secret file‟ of fabricated documents, not seen by the 
defense, which incriminated Dreyfus”). 
42 See DAVID L. LEWIS, PRISONERS OF HONOR: THE DREYFUS AFFAIR 147-48 (1973) (ex-
plaining that reopening the Dreyfus case would ruin the reputation of France‟s “most impor-
tant officers”). 
43 Id. at 143; see also Third Republic 1892-1906, supra note 10; Brief History of the Af-
fair, supra note 39. 
44 NICHOLAS HALASZ, CAPTAIN DREYFUS: THE STORY OF A MASS HYSTERIA 106 (1955). 
45 Id. at 99-100; see also John Ehrman, The Dreyfus Affair: Enduring CI Lessons, 55 
STUD. INTELLIGENCE 21, 24 (2011), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-1/pdfs/CleanedEhrman-
Review%20of%20Dreyfus.pdf (stating that the officers from the General Staff “conspired 
directly with Esterházy to forge more documents to add to the case against Dreyfus”); Lubet, 
supra note 19, at 332 (discussing how the French military chose to protect Esterhazy instead 
8
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Boisdeffre paid a professional price when his glibness on the subject 
was discovered.46 
The expression of the truth was also blocked by a burst of ir-
rationality; the only explanation for the inexplicable relentlessness of 
two former officers of the Fourth Bureau, one of whom had become 
Cavaignac‟s principal private secretary, General Roget, and his other 
aide-de-camp, Captain Cuignet.47  Cuignet, a veritable fanatic, re-
drafted the entire secret indictment file in order to prevent the review 
of the case, reclassifying the hodge-podge of its three-hundred ge-
nuine and falsified documents, and adding a tendentious commentary 
intended to throw off the track judges not familiar with military prac-
tices.48  His activism at the time of the Rennes trial became so un-
bearable that he was dismissed from the army.49  This did not prevent 
him from continuing to vituperate once he became affiliated with Ac-
tion Française.50 
At the Rennes trial, the issue was not to find out whether 
Dreyfus was innocent or guilty, but whether the Republic, as it was 
then functioning, could resist the challenge of the protests going on in 
the streets.51  A battle between the opportunists and the radicals had 
been raging between the years 1894 and 1899; recurrence of high 
street violence by extreme right-wing groups and extreme left-wing 
groups with their anarchist tendencies was greatly feared.52  For the 
high command in solidarity with those in power, charged with main-
taining order in the country, Dreyfus‟s personal situation became less 
 
of liberating Dreyfus). 
46 See HALASZ, supra note 44, at 177 (stating that “Boisdeffre was replaced by General 
Renouard”); ZOLA, supra note 4, at 194 (showing that Colonel Henry was arrested after ad-
mitting to having committed forgery and General de Boisdeffre consequently requested that 
he be relieved of all his duties). 
47 HALASZ, supra note 44, at 173-74; see also READ, supra note 1, at 244, 246, 252. 
48 JACQUES KAYSER, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR 275-76 (Nora Bickley trans., 2010) (1931). 
49 JEAN-DENIS BREDIN, THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS 381 (Jeffrey Mehl-
man trans., George Braziller, Inc. 1986) (1983). 
50 See ROBERT L. HOFFMAN, MORE THAN A TRIAL: THE STRUGGLE OVER CAPTAIN DREYFUS 
33 (1980) (describing the Action Française); READ, supra note 1, at 337 (labeling Captain 
Cuignet as “a recent convert to anti-Dreyfusism”). 
51 See BREDIN, supra note 49, at 285-86 (describing what occurred in the streets). 
52 Id. at 285-86, 288; see also LEWIS, supra note 42, at 251 (describing the fear of another 
Commune); BETTY SCHECHTER, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: A NATIONAL SCANDAL 135 (1965) 
(“Where did the greater danger to France lie—in facing the demands of democracy or in de-
nying them?”); HOFFMAN, supra note 50, at 188 (describing the two camps that were formed 
as a result of the Dreyfus affair). 
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important.53  Whether he was guilty or innocent no longer held any 
interest—the aim was to stabilize the political and social situation.54 
The first conclusion is that Dreyfus‟s fate depended on the 
machinations of a handful of individuals, for the most part military 
leaders at the top rung of the hierarchy. 
V. AND WHAT ABOUT THE ARMY AS A CONSTITUENT BODY? 
In a period when the army was adapting slowly to the Repub-
lic but very badly to parliamentary government, the challenge to hie-
rarchy coagulated thinking.  As Armand Charpentier accurately ob-
serves: “The question, for them, was no longer to know whether the 
bordereau was Esterhazy‟s or Dreyfus‟s, but rather to defend the ma-
jor leaders representing the army against Dreyfus, who had become a 
symbolic entity behind which were grouped together Jews, intellec-
tuals, revolutionaries, all the so-called enemies of the army.”55  The 
course of events only served to reinforce this attitude, with the major-
ity heeding the cries of Action Française—the army‟s self-proclaimed 
defender.56  The minority, who were expressing doubts, had no 
choice but to keep their feelings quiet or leave the army.57 
The idea that a process of destabilization of the army was 
operative was only strengthened in the years afterward when the ar-
my, where many officers were graduates of parochial schools, had to 
take part in the obligatory opening up of Catholic religious institu-
tions.58  At the same time, the discovery that their promotion was 
henceforth controlled by political power, informed by secret files, 
and drafted by Freemason organizations caused a widening sense of 
victimization.59  They did not grasp that these emergency measures 
stemmed from fear of the political sphere—the specter of collusion 
between the army and right-wing rioters to bring down the regime—
 
53 See SCHECHTER, supra note 52, at 134-35 (describing what the Dreyfus case evolved 
into); HOFFMAN, supra note 50, at 187 (“Alfred Dreyfus was no longer the principal focal 
point for contention, but France remained divided and at war with itself.”). 
54 BREDIN, supra note 49, at 296. 
55 ARMAND CHARPENTIER, LES COTES MYSTERIEUX DE L‟AFFAIRE DREYFUS 319 (1937). 
56 THE CONDEMNATION OF THE “ACTION FRANÇAISE” 8 (Leo Ward ed., 1928). 
57 MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE POLITICS OF ASSIMILATION: A STUDY OF THE FRENCH JEWISH 
COMMUNITY AT THE TIME OF THE DREYFUS AFFAIR 212 (1971). 
58 PIERS PAUL READ, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: THE STORY OF THE MOST INFAMOUS 
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE IN FRENCH HISTORY 30, 263 (2012). 
59 BREDIN, supra note 49, at 113. 
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which had perceived the absence of the republican feeling in its cor-
poratist spirit.60 
Déroulède‟s exhortation, made on February 27, 1899, to Gen-
eral Roget to rally his troops behind his supporters at President 
Faure‟s funeral and to march on Élysée Palace, coupled with the lack 
of response by the military security service when the president of the 
republic had been manhandled in Auteuil on June 4, 1899, explain a 
tightening of political power and not a desire to dismantle the army.61  
However, in the community of the officers corps, formed in the anal-
ysis of events according to the binary concept of friend-or-foe, the of-
ficers saw in this tight political surveillance of their institution the ac-
tion of a vague, many-faceted and hateful enemy: the Dreyfusards, an 
ill-defined group, who were suspected of being fundamentally anti-
military and—an even more slanderous suspicion—anti-patriotic, a 
grave insult at the time.62 
They saw the denunciation of military behavior, such as the 
conduct of the Military Justice during the First World War, for exam-
ple, or the practice of torture in Algeria, as the actions of the heirs of 
those who had challenged the authority of the army‟s 1894 “final 
verdict” on Dreyfus.63  It was not a leap for them to target this line of 
descent since the protesters proclaimed themselves to be the uphold-
ers and spiritual heirs of these very Dreyfusards, as in the case of the 
late Pierre Vidal-Naquet.64 
Thus Dreyfus‟s name, even today, remains connected to tense 
and dark periods in the history of the army and, therefore, remains a 
subject no one wants to broach in the officers‟ club.65  However, the 
army considers him one of its own, a victim of a judicial crime due to 
the scheming of General Mercier, and one who, all through his long 
 
60 See H.R. KEDWARD, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: CATALYST FOR TENSIONS IN FRENCH 
SOCIETY 43 (1965) (“[T]he Affair [was] only an incident in the democracy and the counter-
revolution.  While the power of the army remain[ed,] the Revolution [was] unfinished.  Mo-
narchists and Catholics [were] using the army in their plot against the Republic.”); STEPHEN 
WILSON, IDEOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE: ANTISEMITISM IN FRANCE AT THE TIME OF THE DREYFUS 
AFFAIR 433 (1982) (describing the “class struggle” between the right-wing rioters and the 
“Extreme Left”). 
61 FREDERICK BROWN, FOR THE SOUL OF FRANCE: CULTURE WARS IN THE AGE OF DREYFUS 
220 (2010); see also BREDIN, supra note 49, at 385 (describing the attempted attack on the 
president). 
62 BROWN, supra note 61, at 177, 196. 
63 BREDIN, supra note 49, at 540-41. 
64 Id. at 531; 20 ENCYLCOPAEDIA JUDAICA 516-17 (Fred Skolnik et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
65 See KAYSER, supra note 48, at 361 (issuing the order that “[t]he incident is closed!”). 
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ordeal, showed mental strength as well as civic and moral qualities 
worth holding up as examples to young generations of officers.66 
 
 
66 BREDIN, supra note 49, at 356. 
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